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(less) on local public goods provision.  The results are stable after various 
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1 Introduction 
Is dictatorship superior to democracy when it comes to making good and 
efficient economic policies, or is the opposite true? What motivates dictators and 
their subordinates when they make economic decisions and economic choices, like 
investments and public goods provisions, etc.? These are all intriguing questions 
in the literature of the political economy of authoritarianism. 
In this research we examine how heterogeneous power status of local political 
elites resulting from factional politics affects their economic policy choices, in 
China's single-party institutional context, using a unique dataset collected from 
Zhejiang province. We argue that local political elite make policies primarily in a 
way that secures their political survival (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003), i.e., 
retaining office, which is contingent either on the protection from their 
higher-level patrons or on the support from their grassroots constituencies.1 To 
receive protection from the patrons, local politicians must invest resources to send 
credible signals to the higher-ups to demonstrate loyalty; whereas to win the 
grassroots support, they must provide policies and institutions to economically 
benefit his or her supporters.  Hence, the local political elites face the trade-off of 
how to allocate limited resources between the two activities. For example, they 
could invest more resources to signal their loyalty to their higher-level patrons, 
which surely leads to huge economic waste and inefficiency. Alternatively, they 
                                                             
1
 By grassroots constituencies, we do not necessarily mean those who are excluded by 
the regime, such as ordinary people. In China's context, they could also include those 
merchants and even local low-level officials, such as county, township, and urban 
district level cadres, etc. 
could shift more resources for local economic development to win over local 
grassroots support, e.g., by refraining from predatory behaviors, avoiding excess 
taxation, more social public goods provisions, etc., which brings about robust 
broad-based economic growth even in an environment feature with imperfect 
institutions at national level such as weak property rights protection and overall 
discrimination against private sector vis-à-via state sector. 
 We further argue that local political elites are ex ante heterogeneous in terms 
of their connection with higher-level power holders. Some may have ex ante close 
ties to powerful figures at higher levels and therefore enjoy better chances of 
political survival ceteris paribus, while others are largely excluded from the clubs 
formed by higher level patrons, and their political survival is therefore exposed to 
huge uncertainties if they rely on the existing networks. Hence political elites who 
are politically marginalized by factional politics within the regime are obliged to 
seek more support from the grassroots constituents, to increase their chance of 
political survival. As a result, those local politicians, who have close ties with the 
patrons, will invest relatively more resources in signaling their loyalty, as they are 
more effective in engaging this activity. In contrast, the other local politicians, who 
do not have such ties and are political marginalized in the extant power hierarchy, 
will make more effort to foster a growth-enhancing business environment that 
benefits their local constituents. 
We develop a simple theoretical model in which the political survival of a 
local politician is determined by the joint outputs of loyalty signaling and local 
economic development.  The two outputs are substitutes to each other, and a local 
politician who has a close political tie is more effective in signaling his loyalty to 
the higher-level patrons.  Given this assumption, a well-connected local politician 
will invest relatively more resources in signaling his loyalty, if compared with a 
poorly-connected one.  We clearly model the competition equilibrium between 
these two types of local politicians.  Our model implies higher tax rates and 
lower public goods investment in localities where the political elites have closer 
factional ties with higher-level patrons. Furthermore, the model also shows that 
higher tax rates and less investment in public goods will drive away private capital. 
As a result, the localities governed by the well-connected politicians have slower 
economic growth, heavier tax burdens, and lower public goods investment than 
those run by the politically marginalized politicians.  
We use a unique county-level longitudinal data from Zhejiang province to 
test the theoretical hypotheses. The merits of using Zhejiang's county-level data 
are twofold: first, county and township governments are at the lowest tier of 
administrative structure in China and are in charge of policy making and 
implementation at the grassroots level. 2 Second, and more importantly, the 
pre-1949 communist revolution in Zhejiang provides a natural experiment to 
divide local political elites into two rival factions, which enables us to distinguish 
the factional backgrounds of local politicians and contrast economic policies 
                                                             
2 The Chinese hierarchical administrative system ranks as follows (from low to 
high): township, county, province, and the central government. 
between counties governed by politicians with different factional ties. Based on 
the dataset covering 54 counties spanning 1994 to 2005, the regression results are 
consistent with our arguments: during this period, counties ruled by politicians 
with close factional ties with the provincial leadership have higher tax rates, lower 
public expenditures on education, and slower growth rate of per capita GDP.  
And these results are stable after various robust tests. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 elaborates on 
how factional politics in communist regimes influence political elites' economic 
policy making; Section 3 sets up our theoretical model and derives testable 
hypotheses; Section 4 briefly introduces the revolutionary history of Zhejiang 
province prior to 1949, which we use to identify the factional backgrounds of 
political elites who are currently governing the province's counties; Section 5 
describes the estimation strategy and the results; Section 6 concludes. 
2. Factionalism and policy choices in communist regimes 
Our analysis starts with one fundamental problem with the factional politics 
that is widely believed to be pervasive in communist countries (Nathan 1973; 
Easter 1996). That is, due to the lack of regular votes and the absence of a free 
media, patrons are always in the dark about the loyalty of their subordinates 
(Wintrobe 1998). As a result, they are actually vulnerable to clients' likely betrayal 
during a power crisis that can dethrone the patrons. Hence the patrons have the 
dire need to obtain knowledge of their subordinates' loyalty to minimize the 
likelihood of the latter, that is, the clients reneging on the factional bargain. This 
makes demonstrating loyalty to the patrons a central task for clients at all echelons 
of bureaucracy.3 Sending loyalty signals is not only a nauseating job in the 
psychological sense, but consumes huge economic resources, leading to massive 
resource misallocation and waste. In the context of China, examples include 
launching propaganda campaigns that bootlick powerful political figures, giving 
lucrative government contracts to the friends and family members of power 
holders at high levels, and building flashy infrastructure projects in order to court 
the higher-ups with ambitious economic visions. In some circumstances, this can 
cause economic disarray and even disaster.4 The socioeconomic costs associated 
with the loyalty displaying, however, make it credible rather than a cheap talk, 
especially when such costs jeopardize the interests of their potential grassroots 
supporters. 
On the other hand, political elites likely differ in their incentives of 
displaying loyalty, which is contingent on their heterogeneous power status in the 
power structure shaped by factionalism. For those elites who are included in the 
dominant factions and rely on established patron-client networks within the regime 
                                                             
3
 For a study on how provincial leaders engaged in ideological campaigns to display 
their loyalty to the then Party Secretary General Jiang Zemin during 2001-2004, see 
Shih (2008). 
4
 One example is the Great Famine, part of the Great Leap Forward movement from 
1959-1961. Kung and Chen (2011) argue that those party elites who had the highest 
incentive for promotions into the top echelons of party hierarchy made greater efforts 
to carry out Mao's radical grain procurement policy, in order to look good in front of 
Mao. Their actions, thus led to higher death rates in provinces under their 
jurisdictions. 
to secure their political livelihood, they have strong motivations to carry out 
policies in line with the preference of their patrons to demonstrate their loyalty, 
even at the cost of social interests.  
In contrast, for those who are excluded from dominant factions, and 
therefore are endowed with significantly less political resources and left 
vulnerable to attacks from the dominant factions, such factionalism compels them 
to seek help from forces outside the factions and the regime, i.e., from grassroots 
constituents. Given their limited resources, marginalized elites could hardly resort to 
the costly strategy of clientelism by providing a continual stream of material benefits 
to supporters (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). Instead, they have to provide social 
public goods such as growth-enhancing institutions to economically benefit their 
constituents, thereby winning grassroots support.5   
As long as the marginalized politicians’ shaky status and their vulnerability 
to attack remains due to factional struggles within the regime, the aids they offer to 
their local selectorate will be continuous and long-lasting, which is indispensable 
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 Students of China studies have observed that, in many localities, local officials often 
connect strongly and collude with their local constituents to protect them from the 
encroachment of radical state policies, to help them get around state regulations or 
prohibitions against deviant economic activities, or to facilitate the cooperation 
between local government and local people in pushing forward rural non-state 
industrialization (Oi 1985, 1997; Liu 1992; Tsai 2006). Hence, compared with current 
scholarship which attributes local officials' close connections with ordinary people to 
their local native values and identity, our research provides an additional political 
economy interpretation for why and under what circumstance such elite-mass linkage 
could be so deep-rooted and pervasive in a Leninist system like China. 
for de facto protection of private property rights and fostering entrepreneurship 
under the communist regime. In addition, when the marginalized elites are loosely 
connected to higher authorities so that they have ex ante difficulty in credibly 
signaling their loyalty, and when signaling loyalty causes giant waste and 
misallocations of economic resources that would have been used otherwise to 
benefit local people and society, it would have been a risky strategy for the 
marginalized elites to demonstrate loyalty to the higher-ups at the expense of their 
grassroots constituencies due to the incompatibility between courting the power 
holders and meeting the popular desire for better economic well-being through 
broad-based economic development. Therefore, at equilibrium local political elites 
who are not included in the dominant factions will invest less resources in loyalty 
demonstration but more resources in promoting local economic welfare.  
Our research is related to recent literature on information revelation over 
loyalty in authoritarian regimes. Based on cross-country case studies, many 
scholars point out that authoritarian countries have contrived various methods for 
revealing such information. For example, the propaganda campaigns in China 
(Shih 2008) and national and regional elections in Russia (Reuter and Robertson 
2012) help authoritarian leaders assess the political loyalty of their subordinates. 
Similarly, Svolik (2012) argued that many authoritarian countries set up seemingly 
democratic institutions, e.g., legislature and elections, etc, to mitigate the 
information asymmetry between the dictators and other ruling elites. 
 These authors assume that subordinates in authoritarian regimes have the 
same motivation to show loyalty to their patrons. Unlike them, we argue that local 
politicians' loyalty demonstration should first and foremost be viewed as a 
decision based on the tradeoff between demonstrating loyalty to their patrons or 
cultivating a grassroots political foundation. The former strategy requires the 
economically inefficient and wasteful investment of sending loyalty signals, while 
the latter strategy leads to the growth-enhancing investment of social public goods. 
The equilibrium result is contingent on local officials’ power status, i.e., their 
connections with the power holders, shaped by factionalism. 
 This paper is also related to the theoretical debate within the wider literature 
on politicians' recruitment and appointment, in the context of authoritarianism in 
general, and of China in particular. On one hand, China's nomenklatura system is 
viewed as a prime example of appointing cadres based on their ability to generate 
economic growth, i.e., the central government successfully makes use of a national 
cadre appointment and promotion system to induce regional administrators to 
compete with each other to generate economic growth, in order to win promotion 
in the ruling CCP (Chen et al. 2005; Li and Zhou 2005; Xu 2011). Such a 
personnel management and evaluation system is emulated by the sub-provincial 
governments at various levels, e.g., county and township governments, to spur 
economic growth and maximize fiscal revenues (Landry 2008; Whiting 2004; 
Edin 2003). However, recent quantitative studies have found no evidence for 
growth-based promotions at prefectural and city levels (Guo 2007; Landry 2008). 
At the central level, Shih et al. (2012) found that, through much of the reform 
period, factional ties with top leaders, rather than performance-based measures, 
boosted the chances of climbing higher in the CCP upper echelons. 
  Our findings in this research are consistent with the skeptics who question 
whether authoritarianism can seamlessly walk the line between meritocratic and 
loyalty-based standards of promotion and appointment. As the Zhejiang case 
shows, officials from the counties with better economic performance can hardly 
guarantee their career advancement, because they are excluded from the provincial 
dominant faction. Moreover, our research helps illuminate why, in a communist 
state such as China, the loyalty-based and performance-based standards are 
incompatible: authoritarian politics in general encourages political elites to indulge 
in a game of demonstrating loyalty to the king makers, thus diverting countless 
resources to non-productive usage, and resulting in huge economic waste and 
inefficiency. Only those who are naturally marginalized by the dominant faction 
have sufficient incentive to enhance economic institutions and governance. 
 
3 The Model 
    We develop a simple model that characterizes the policy choices of local 
politicians under factional politics. A local politician6 makes policy decisions 
under the premier concern of political survival, which is contingent both on the 
protection by higher-level patrons and on the supports from his grassroots 
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 A representative local politician can be an individual decision maker, or a group of 
political elites who belong to the same faction and share the same policy preferences. 
constituents.  Therefore, the local politician's policy decision is indeed twofold: 
signaling his loyalty to the patrons and developing local economy through public 
investment.  Both activities are economically costly and financed through local 
taxation.  Moreover, we assume local politicians are ex ante heterogeneous in 
terms of their political connections with the patrons. 
This model is based on Cai and Treisman (2005), where they explore capital 
competition across regions.  Here, we focus instead on how factional politics 
could affect the policy choices of local politicians in a competitive equilibrium, 
and on its implications on local economic development.  Besides, it is worth 
attention that our model here is a static one, where we do not investigate the 
endogenous formation and evolution of political connections. 
 
3.1 Setup 
Consider an economy where there are N local jurisdictions, each governed 
by a local politician ig , i=1, 2,⋯, N.  The local politicians differ in their political 
connections with the patrons at higher level.  For simplicity, we assume among 
the local politicians, NM  of them are well-connected, while the other MN 
are poorly-connected.  We denote the group of well-connected politicians as G , 
and the poorly-connected as G .   
 The premier concern of a local politician is political survival, which is 
determined jointly by the effective output of loyalty signaling to his patrons, and 
the local economic output that benefits local constituents.  Therefore, a local 
politician ig 's, i=1, 2,⋯, N, payoff is 
                
iiii YSu                        (1)    
where iS  represents signaling expenditure, and iY  is local gross economic 
output.7 i  is a parameter measuring signaling efficiency, and  







Ggif
Ggif
i
i
i
,
,


  
with 0< < <1. Therefore, a well-connected ig  is more efficient in signaling his 
loyalty to the patron than a poorly-connected one.8 
The gross output of iY  is in the form of Cobb-Douglas, 
             iiiii IAkIkfY  ,           (2)   
where ik  is local private capital, and iI  is local public investment, such as 
infrastructure or other public investments that facilitate economic output.  We 
assume decreasing return to scale, e.g., 1  .   
We assume capital is fully mobile across local jurisdictions, and the total 
capital stock is  
N
i i
kK
1
, which is taken as given.  Each local government has 
an initial fiscal revenue of R₀, and a local government's budget constraint is thus 
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 To be sure, signaling loyalty can sometime cause overall growth by boosting 
investment in projects favored by the patron. However, the beneficiaries of such 
growth cannot be potential supporters of the poorly-connected. To distinguish the 
heterogeneous effect of growth, we restrict Y to be the output that benefits private 
sector foremost. 
8 One thing worthy of attention is that, our model is not a signaling model, in which 
signaling private information plays a central role. Instead, our model is about 
signaling activity, which is substitutable to economic output Y, and there is no 
information asymmetry in our model. 
     iiii YtRSI  0                      (3) 
where it  is the tax rate in region i.  
We investigate a static game where all the local governments simultaneously 
make their decisions.  A local politician ig  selects his signaling expenditure iS , 
public investment iI  and tax rate it  to maximize the value of the payoff function 
of equation (1). 
 
3.2 Results 
As private capital is fully mobile across different regions, it is necessary that 
in equilibrium the net return of private capital must be the same across regions.  
Let r  be the equilibrium net return of capital, then in equilibrium it is necessary 
that 
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Furthermore, we assume N is large enough and each local politician takes r  
as given in equilibrium.  Then, in equilibrium 
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which defines the equilibrium capital allocation,   
 , as function of it  and iI . The 
following result is obvious. 
Lemma 1:  In equilibrium, other things equal, more private capital will be 
allocated to regions with lower tax rate it  and higher public investment iI . 
0
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Proof:   Take log on both sides of equation (4), and it is easy to show that 
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The intuition behind this result is straightforward: higher tax rate or lower 
government investment will drive away private capital, as both government 
policies will reduce the net marginal returns of capital.  Next, we investigate a 
local politician ig 's optimal policy choice, which includes the optimal levels of 
signaling expenditure iS , public investment iI  and tax rate it .  The problem 
for a local politician is as below 
  
  iiiiiii
iiiiiitSI
IItkftRSIts
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iii
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    (5)            
where the equilibrium capital allocation )( iiii Itkk 
 is governed by equation (4). 
Substituting the budget constraint of the government and by rearrangement, the 
first order conditions for optimization are 
 
  
1
1 =0
1 1
i
i i i i i i i
i i
u
Ak I t Ak I
t t
     


  
  
        (6) 
 
 
1 11 0
1
i I
i i i i i i i
i i
u K
t Ak I Ak I
I I
      

 
 
     
  
     (7) 
Moreover, the second order sufficient conditions are satisfied given our 
assumption of technology.  From the first condition of equation (6), we have the 
following expression of optimal tax rate 
 
 1i
i
t



             (8) 
It is evident that 

i
t  is strictly increasing in i .  We let t  denote the 
optimal tax rate for a well-connected politician, and t  that for a poorly-connected 
one, and we get the following result. 
Lemma 2  In equilibrium, a well-connected local politician chooses higher 
tax rate than a poorly-connected one, that is, 
t t  
From the second condition of equation (7), we get the following condition 
for optimal government investment 
1
11
1i i
i
I Ak

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
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       (9) 
A first glance of equation (9) reveals that 

i
I  decreases in i  and increase 
in ik .  Let I  and I  denote respectively the optimal government investment 
by a well-connected and a poorly-connected politician, and a formal result is 
summarized as below 
Lemma 3 In equilibrium, a poorly-connected local politician invests more 
in public investment than a well-connected leader, that is, 
II   
Proof:  First taking log of equation (9), 
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and then taking partial differentiation with respect to i , we get 
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After some simple re-arrangement, we get 
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The right hand side of the equation is negative as 0
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, and on the left 
handside, α + β < 1 by assumption. Therefore, we have 0

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From the above two lemmas and the expression of  iii Itk ,  in equation 
(4), we get the following result about the equilibrium capital allocation, where  
and   follow the same notation rule as above. 
Lemma 4  In equilibrium, a politically poorly-connected region attracts 
more private capital than a well-connected one, that is, 
      
 
4 Historical background, data, and measurements 
The simple model developed in section 3 provides several testable 
hypotheses. Lemma 2 and lemma 3 suggest that areas ruled by the poorly 
connected politicians will have a more growth-enhancing business environment 
with lower tax burdens and more investment in socially public goods. Lemma 1 
considers the responses of private investors to the difference in governance across 
localities, and the final equilibrium is embodied by lemma 4. In this section we use 
county-level data in the Zhejiang province of China to test if the empirical 
evidence are consistent with the theoretical predictions. Specifically, we will 
present evidence showing how the intraprovincial factional politics affected tax 
burdens, public expenditures (on public goods), and, eventually economic growth 
rates across counties in Zhejiang province. 
4.1 Factionalism in Zhejiang since 1949 
Testing the above hypotheses requires data on factional politics to 
distinguish politicians who belong to the dominant faction from those who are 
excluded from the patron-client network. Fortunately, a natural experiment of the 
pre-1949 revolution in Zhejiang province led to the formation of two opposing 
factions in 1949 that still persist today. One faction was established by the central 
army, among others the Third Field Army, which entered and took over the 
province in 1949. The military officials and the civilian cadres affiliated with the 
central army system were called the Southbound Cadres (SCs), because the vast 
majority of them were from the Northern provinces, e.g., Shandong, Jiangsu, etc. 
As the central army conquered many parts of Zhejiang, these areas were under the 
direct control of the SCs (hereafter the non-guerrilla area). Another faction was led 
by the local guerrilla cadres (LGCs), who had developed into powerful forces 
through independent guerrilla warfare against the then ruling Nationalist Party 
(GMD) before 1949. In 1949, even before the central army entered Zhejiang, the 
local guerrillas had taken over 16 county seats on their own and put more under 
their direct control (hereafter the guerrilla area). Therefore in 1949 the political 
power in Zhejiang was shared by the SC group and the LGC group. 
 In the ensuing power struggle, the LGCs were disadvantaged not only 
because the SCs sent by the party center were seen as enforcers for the ruling 
power holders,9 but also because the LGCs had minimal direct contact with the 
party center during the guerrilla warfare period, let alone any close personal ties 
with prominent figures in the party center. As a result, the SCs held more powerful 
positions in provincial leadership than the LGCs during most of the post-1949 
period. Figure 1 shows the evolution of composition of the party's provincial 
standing committee (PPSC), the paramount power body in the province, from 
1950 to 1994.10 As we can see, until the early 1980s more than 60 percent of 
members sitting in the PPSC were still SCs, while, by the end of the 1980s the 
proportion of LGCs was less than 20 percent. 11  Moreover, although the 
first-generation SCs began to vanish from the political arena by the early 1990s, 
the networks they cultivated during the Mao era persevered, and continue to play a 
role in the post-Mao era.12 Even today, as expected, the confrontation between the 
                                                             
9
 For example, both Tan Zhenlin, the first top provincial leader after 1949, and his 
successor Jiang Hua, who was in charge of Zhejiang for nearly 12 years, from 1954 
onwards, were Mao's close aids before 1949. 
10 In the figure, the SCs are those who are directly from the Third Field Army and its 
affiliated civilian officials who entered Zhejiang in 1949. The LGCs are those who 
participated in the guerrilla warfare before 1949. We do not include those who were 
elevated to the PPSC only after 1949 as well as those who were transferred to 
Zhejiang from outside provinces after 1949. So the sum of the SCs proportion and the 
LGCs proportion can be less than 1. 
11
 In fact, at local level, even in many counties taken over by the LGCs senior 
positions such as party county secretaries and county heads were occupied by the SCs. 
But LGCs continued to maintain a majority status below the county level, including at 
township and village levels, and therefore to a large extent swayed the de facto policy 
implementations in local society in practice.  
12
 The power struggle between the two groups has always been quite complicated 
SCs and the GCs are still pervasive across locales in Zhejiang,13 and most 
provincial senior officials are mainly recruited from the traditional sphere of the 
influence of the SCs, which are typical non-guerrilla regions, 14 as well as from 
the province-affiliated SOEs, rather than from places traditionally under the 
control of the LGCs. In addition, the SC continues to dominate provincial 
leadership, while the LGC group is largely marginalized. In short, factionalism 
born in the Mao era is still alive and well. The politics in Zhejiang, therefore, 
enable us to exploit the information about factionalism in the province to test our 
hypotheses. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
4.2 Data and measurement 
    The factionalism in Zhejiang introduced in section 4.1 suggests that we can 
                                                                                                                                                                              
over such a long period. Basically speaking, the SCs were on the offensive and 
maintained the upper hand in the fight until the mid-1960s. For example, among 
the fourteen members serving in the first session of the PPSC (1949-1954), only 
three of them had guerrilla backgrounds. However, after Yang Siyi and Sha 
Wenhan were purged from the PPSC in 1957, until 1970 no one in the PPSC was 
from the LGC camp. The SCs were substantially weakened during the Cultural 
Revolution, compared to their previous position, and were no longer able to 
persecute the LGCs in the same manner as they had been doing before. In the 
post-reform era, the two groups have continued to jostle for power, but in a much 
gentler fashion. 
13
 In a field interview with a local party cadre, he told the authors that in the county he 
lives, the power struggle between the two camps is still fierce. Oral source, in Tian’tai 
county, August 2009.  
14
 These regions are well known as the so-called Hangzhou-Jiaxing-Huzhou area. 
measure local politicians' factional ties according to where they are serving their 
offices. For local politicians in localities which belonged to the sphere of influence 
of the guerrillas before 1949, their political connections with the provincial 
leadership have been rather weak after 1949, while their counterparts in localities 
that are under the control of the southbound cadres have maintained tight 
connections with the provincial authority since 1949. Thus we divide Zhejiang's 
counties into two categories: guerrilla counties (GCs) and non-guerrilla counties 
(non-GCs). A county is viewed as a GC as long as any one of the following criteria 
is met: (1) There were military forces established as early as the Anti-Japanese 
War (AJW) period (1937-1945), or (2) the county city was liberated by local 
guerrilla, rather than by the central field army, in 1949. Otherwise this county is 
viewed as a non-GC. Correspondingly, we construct a dummy variable GC taking 
value of 1 if it is viewed as a guerrilla county and of 0 otherwise. The definition of 
GCs/Non-GCs captures the fact that in Zhejiang the de facto local power 
configuration at county level and below and the resulting policy outcomes are not 
simply shaped by nominal local leadership and individual leading cadres, but 
instead are basically influenced by the conflicts and power balance between the 
two political groups, i.e., LGCs and SCs, and therefore are influenced by the 
differentiated incentives of local political elites as well, including those county and 
township level cadres (Zhang and Liu 2013; Zhang, Liu, and Shih 2013).15 Panel 
                                                             
15
 In this vein, many scholars have noted that in China even local officials and 
cadres at grassroots levels can significantly influence policy implementations and 
its consequences, e.g., by selectively carrying out some policies whereas blocking 
A of Table 1 (the first row) gives the number of GCs and Non-GCs. 
Our theory suggests that local political elites' policy choices are affected by 
their factional ties with their patron at higher levels. To measure the policy stances 
of a locality (county), we use two main variables in terms of the actual policy 
outcomes: county tax burdens as per capita county tax revenue (PTR) 16 and 
county public expenditures on social public goods as per capita county fiscal 
expenditure on education (FISCAL_EDU). 
As for the county tax burden variable of PTR, it is noteworthy that it only 
considers the tax revenues submitted to subnational governments, including 
provincial government and county government, but excludes the revenues going to 
                                                                                                                                                                              
others, no matter whether these policies are assigned by the central government or 
by their supervisors. See O’Brien and Li (1996), Oi (1985), Liu (1992), Tsai 
(2006).  
16
 The PTR does not include extra-budgetary revenues (EBR), which is another 
revenue source for many local governments in China. Unlike tax revenues, EBRs 
are ad hoc fees, levies and charges on businesses and individual persons such as 
peasants under different names and justifications, and the local government has the 
full discretion over its usage. Thus EBRs can be viewed as a kind of implicit taxes. 
In this research we do not consider EBRs because many counties do not report 
extra-budgetary revenue figures until after 1999 so that the total observations 
reduce by nearly half if we take the EBRs into account. Even after 1999, many 
counties still avoid disclosing any information about extra-budgetary revenues. No 
doubt this will downplay the effect of factional politics since these non-guerrilla 
counties tend to conceal their extractive tax-collection behaviors. However, if we 
include EBRs when calculating the per capita tax burdens, despite the considerable 
loss of observations, we still get similar results as what we report here. For space 
reason, we do not present these results, which are available on request.    
the central government. The reason is that under the current Tax-sharing System 
(fen shui zhi) introduced in 1994, the central government established its own tax 
collection capabilities (state tax bureau) to get all tax revenues belonging to the 
center. 17 County government only has the discretion to levy local income taxes. 
18 
The data for constructing guerrilla county dummy variable are from various 
county gazetteers, and dozens of official publications, government documents, and 
archival materials collected by the authors. The original data for policy variables, 
i.e., tax burdens as well as public expenditures on education, are from The Fiscal 
Data of All Prefectures, Counties, and Cities of China from 1993 to 2005. Finally, 
we have unbalanced data covering 53 counties spanning 1993 to 2005. Panel B of 
table 1 gives the descriptive statistics of the policy variables. 
[Table 1 about here] 
5  Estimation strategy and results 
5.1 Estimated equation 
The baseline equation to be estimated is 
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 Even taxes shared between the central and subnational governments are collected 
by the central government, with those taxes for the subnational governments returned 
to them later on. 
18
 The Tax-sharing System does not stipulate how the subnational fiscal system ought 
to work. Because of this, subprovincial fiscal institutions vary substantially across 
provinces in China. Zhejiang adopts a so-called province-governing-county (sheng 
guan xian) fiscal system in which county government collects all local income taxes 
and then shares it with the provincial government. For a detailed account of 
Zhejiang's intraprovincial fiscal system, see Qian and Zhang (2017). 
   ln lnit it i t itPolicy GC X G T                
where subscripts i and t are ith county and tth year, respectively. GC is the 
guerrilla county dummy.19 Policy stands for the policy variables, including per 
capita tax burdens as PTR and public expenditures on education as FISCAL_EDU. 
According to our theory, we expect the estimated coefficient of GC to be negative 
when the dependent variables is PTR and to be positive when the dependent 
variable is FISCAL_EDU. 
X includes two control variables reflecting the social and economic 
environments, that is, per capita GDP and total population. Particularly, we use 
one year lagged per capita GDP to address the potential endogeneity problem. G 
includes three variables controlling for a county's geographical features: logarithm 
of the shortest distance from the county seat to Hangzhou (the provincial capital 
city, DISTANCE), logarithm of the altitude of the county seat (ALTITUDE), and a 
dummy variable for when the county is a coastal county (COAST). T is time trend 
variable. νt is year fixed effect. εit is error term. All monetary variables 
(expenditures and income) are measured in 1993 price and therefore are 
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 The GC dummy captures the cross-sectional variation between guerrilla counties 
and non-guerrilla counties, but not temporal variation in the nature of factional ties 
with the provincial authority. Since our main objective is to contrast policy differences 
between local officials in different counties belonging to the two different factions, 
which result from the institutional feature shaped in 1949 and persisted in to today in 
the sense that they do not change after 1949, failing to capture the temporal variation 
in factional connections with the provincial patrons does not invalidate our results. 
For a recent work using similar identification strategy, see Lü and Landry (2014). 
comparable. We use Prais--Winsten regressions with panel corrected standard 
errors (PCSEs) that correct for panel heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous 
correlations by assuming an AR(1) structure. 
 
5.2 Results 
    Table 2 shows the results of the estimation of the baseline model. The 
first column shows the results when the dependent variables is PTR, in which the 
estimated coefficient of GC is negative and statistically significant at the 5 percent 
level, suggesting that guerrilla counties have lower tax burdens, measured as per 
capita local tax revenue. This result is consistent with our theoretical prediction 
that localities that have weak political connections with the provincial leadership 
should have lower tax burdens. The marginal effect of being a guerrilla county is 
sensible. According to the estimated coefficient, if a non-guerrilla county turned 
into a guerrilla county, then its per capita local tax revenue will decrease by 
around 10.3 percent. 
Among the control variables, both lagged per capita GDP and total 
population have positive coefficients and are statistically significant. For the 
marginal effect of income level, on average one percent increase of per capita 
GDP is associated with a 2.3 percent increase of the tax burdens in column 1. For 
the marginal effect of population size, on average a one percent increase of county 
population will lead tax burdens to increase by 0.8 percent. In addition, all three of 
the geographical variables are not significant in column 1. 
 Column 2 reports the results for county public expenditure on education. As 
expected, the coefficient of GC is positive and statistically significant at the 1 
percent level. However, the marginal effect of being a guerrilla county is not as 
large as those in the first column. With all other things being equal, if a 
non-guerrilla county had turned into a guerrilla county, its public expenditure on 
education would have increased by 2 percent. In addition, a one percent increase 
of per capita GDP in the last year corresponds to a 0.53 percent increase in public 
expenditure on education, and a one percent increase of county population size 
will decrease the expenditure on education by 0.16 percent. 
 Column 3 presents the results obtained when the dependent variable is the 
annual growth rate of per capita GDP. If factional politics affect the establishment 
of growth-enhancing institutions by influencing local politicians' resource 
allocation, then it should affect local private sector growth, as well. Lemma 4 in 
section 3 also predicts that a region that is poorly-connected, politically speaking, 
attracts more private capital than a well-connected one. Since we do not have 
private investment and growth data, we use the annual growth rate of county per 
capita GDP as a proxy for them. 20 The rationale of using the annual growth rate 
of per capita GDP is that Zhejiang's economic growth in the reform era has been 
relying mainly on its private sector growth, which is dubbed as the Zhejiang model. 
As we can see from the results in column 3, GC has a positive and very significant 
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 The annual growth rate in tth year is calculated as (Growth of tY )=Ln(
1t
t
Y
Y
) 
coefficient, suggesting a guerrilla county income level as per capita GDP will 
grow faster each year by nearly two percent more than a non-guerrilla county, all 
other things being equal. 
[Table 2 about here] 
5.3 Robustness Check 
        To see if the above results and inferences are robust, we first adopt a 
new metric to distinguish between guerrilla counties and non-guerrilla counties. In 
the old definition of GC, all counties liberated by local guerrillas on their own in 
1949 were labeled as guerrilla counties. However, some of them only rarely, or 
even never, experienced guerrilla activities before their arrival, and thus the 
guerillas' de facto influence in these counties was still rather weak after 1949. By 
virtue of this, it might seem arbitrary to categorize these counties as guerrilla 
counties, since it was relatively easy for the southbound group to take their place 
after 1949. We address this potential problem by constructing a new dummy 
variable GC_new, which excludes those counties that were liberated by the 
guerrillas but had little or no guerrilla activities prior to 1949. As a result, six 
counties which are labeled as guerrilla counties by the definition of GC are now 
regarded as non-guerrilla counties in GC_new. Table 3 shows the estimation 
results using the same empirical strategy employed in section 5.1 but the 
explanatory variable is now GC_new rather than GC. 
As we can see, with the modified definition of guerrilla counties, the 
regression results do not significantly differ from those in Table 2. In column 1, 
the per capita tax burden is 13 percent lower in a guerrilla county than that in a 
non-guerrilla county (compared with a 10 percent gap in Table 1). In column 2, 
guerrilla counties tend to spend more public money on education than 
non-guerrilla counties. On average, per capita expenditure on education in a 
guerrilla county is 2 percent higher than that in a non-guerrilla county. Finally, in 
column 3, a guerrilla county grows faster by 2.1 percent annually than a 
non-guerrilla county. 
[Table 3 about here] 
    As a second step for the robustness test, we study the within-group 
variations among those guerrilla counties (which take the value of 1 in both GC 
and GC_new). We observe that the local guerrillas in different localities may differ 
greatly from each other in terms of guerrilla warfare strategies and tactics before 
1949. To take this into account, we create two new dummy variables: one dummy 
variable is GC_area1, which takes the value of 1, if in a county there are active 
guerrilla forces but they are not the main forces and there are no guerrilla 
headquarters established in that county. Otherwise its value is 0. The second 
dummy variable is GC_area2, which takes the value of 1 if in a county where the 
main guerrilla military force are garrisoned and the guerrilla headquarters are 
located in that county. Otherwise its value is 0. The new estimation results are 
shown in Table 4. 
 As we can see, in column 1, guerrilla county dummies (both GC_area1 and 
GC_area2) have negative coefficients and are statistically significant. According to 
the estimated coefficients, compared with the non-guerrilla counties, the per capita 
tax burden is 16 percent lower in guerrilla counties (GC_area1=1) with active 
guerrilla activities but where no military forces or headquarters were garrisoned in 
the counties before 1949, while that gap is 9.3 percent in guerrilla counties 
(GC_area2=1) with military forces or headquarters garrisoned in the counties 
before 1949. 
 When it comes to public expenditure on education (column 2 results), 
guerrilla counties tend to spend more on education than non-guerrilla counties. 
And the marginal effects are close, i.e. in a guerrilla county with GC_area1=1, the 
per capita expenditure on education is 2.2 percent higher than that in a 
non-guerrilla county, while the gap is 1.9 percent in a guerrilla county with 
GC_area2=1. Finally, in column 3 the marginal effects of being guerrilla counties 
are statistically significant, i.e., 2.2 percentage points higher, in terms of per capita 
GDP growth rate, in GC_area1=1 counties and 1.9 percentage points higher in 
GC_area2=1 counties, respectively. 
[Table 4 about here] 
 We also conduct several other sensitivity tests to see if our findings are 
sensitive to changes of sub-samples, alternative specifications, and competing 
hypotheses. First, we add a new control variable COMPETITION as the median 
growth rate of all counties, except for the county under concern, into the 
regressions. According to the RDA hypothesis, local officials compete with each 
other in order to get promotions. To take this potential mechanism into account, 
we control for COMPETITION in all regressions by using the same empirical 
strategies employed in Table 2, Table 3, and Table 4. In most cases, our 
explanatory variables (GC, GC_new, GC_areas) are still significant and have the 
expected coefficients, while the COMPETITION variable is not statistically 
significant. 
 Second, we look at if the pattern we found above still holds when we 
average all the monetary variables across entire periods and use cross-county OLS 
estimation. To be sure, by using the averaged values rather than the yearly data in 
the county-year panel, the total observations are reduced to 52. Despite the 
considerable loss in the number of observations, we are fortunate to see that in 
most results the explanatory variables still plays a significant role in reducing per 
capita tax burdens, 21  increasing per capita education expenditures, and 
promoting per capita GDP growth. 
In addition, we drop the samples in 1993 to see if the introduced Tax-sharing 
System in 1994 leads to any dramatic changes to our findings. Second, we drop 
some counties, such as Daishan county and Shengsi county, etc., because their 
economies rely disproportionally on fishing industry. Third, we employ other 
regression methods, including ordinary OLS, random panel effect method, and so 
on, to run the regressions. We found our results are robust to all of these changes.22 
                                                             
21 When extra-budgetary revenues are included, the explanatory variables GC and 
GC_new still have negative coefficients but are no longer statistically significant at 
conventional levels. 
22
 For space reason, we do not report these results here. They are available on request. 
Finally, we control for county leaders’ personal backgrounds and political 
connections with provincial leadership (Jia et al. 2014; Shih et al. 2012). To do this, 
we glean data on a county’s county party secretary (CPS) and county head (CH) to 
construct three variables: a dummy variable for the local background of CPS/CH 
(=1, if CPS/CH was born in the county or escalated their career from within the 
county; =0, otherwise); CPS/CH’s connections with provincial leadership, 
measured as the proportion of provincial party standing committee (PPSC) 
members who once shared previous working experience (professional link) with the 
CPS/CH in the county, in the same administrative or party unit for over one year, 
within two administrative steps of one another before they served in the PPSC (Shih 
et al. 2010; Mayer et al. 2015). We found in a majority of these tests our conclusions 
still hold, and they further confirm our argument that in Zhejiang local policy choices 
as well as its outcomes are equilibria resulting more from factional politics between 
the two groups than from individual leading officials’ personal preferences and 
decisions. 
23 
 
5.4 Endogeneity Issue 
An empirical issue regarding the validity of the above findings is that both the 
formation of the guerrilla/non-guerrilla counties and the policy and growth 
variables in effect reflect some conditions that simultaneously drive them. For 
example, some may hypothesize that local cultural factors and traditions could 
                                                             
23
 Ibid. 
cause some counties to be more restive than others in both the pre-1949 and the 
post-1949 periods, which meant that they were sites of guerrilla garrisons before 
1949 and are now more capitalistic. Although such concerns have theoretic 
grounds, we believe they do not apply to this research. As the historical research 
by Zhang and Liu (2013) has shown, the pre-1949 revolutionary history in 
Zhejiang does not support such a doubt. The establishment of Zhejiang's main 
guerrilla areas, as well as the buildup of the guerrilla's strength, resulted from 
historical events that were beyond the control of the revolutionaries, and thus can 
be regarded as random events that have little to do with local societal, cultural, and 
geographic conditions. 24 Second, if local conditions play a big role in driving 
both the formation of the types of counties and current policy outcomes, then it 
must have exert its impact over a long-term horizon. A way to test this is to 
compare the economic variations around 1949 between counties. Therefore we 
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 The two biggest guerrilla areas, Zhe'nan Guerrilla Base Area (ZNGBA) and 
Zhe'dong Guerrilla Base Area (ZDGBA), were both established by the revolutionaries 
from outside provinces in different periods. For example, ZNGBA was first 
established by a column of the red army which was defeated by the GMD in Jiangxi 
province and was forced to retreat to the Zhejiang province. The remnant of this army 
first escaped to the southwest Zhejiang in 1935 but was defeated again shortly. They 
were forced to continue fleeing in to Zhe'nan (the southern Zhejiang) by the late 1935, 
where they established the ZNGBA. As pointed out by Benton (1992), they would not 
have survived 1937, let alone become stronger after, if it weren't for invasion by the 
Japanese that year, which triggered Xi'an Accident which forced the GMD and the 
CCP into a truce against their shared enemy. Similarly, the GDGBA was established 
by revolutionaries who entered eastern Zhejiang in 1944 from Shanghai. See 
Appendix A for details. 
contrast the county-level per capita industrial output (PCIO) in 1952 between the 
guerrilla/non-guerrilla dummies defined above. 25 The t-test results show that 
either the non-guerrilla counties had higher PCIO than the guerrilla counties, or 
that the difference between the two types of counties is not statistically significant 
at all conventional levels. 26 
Besides the above evidence suggesting that today's regional economic 
differences are shaped by the post-1949 factional politics rather than by the 
compounding factors endemic to local societies, we adopt a formal endogenous 
treatment (ET) model to identify the effects of political connections by viewing 
the formation of GCs as an endogenous binary-variable treatment so as to allow 
for correlation between the unobservables that affect the treatment and the 
unobservables that affect the potential outcomes (Heckman 1978). To implement 
the ET estimation, besides the three county characteristics such as DISTANCE, 
ALTITUDE, and COAST, we include two additional variables into the treatment 
assignment: one is GC_Neighbor, measured as the proportion of a county’s 
neighboring counties which had active guerrilla activities before 1949; the other is 
BORDER, a dummy variable for whether a county is located alongside the border 
line separating Zhejiang and other provinces (like Fujian province, An’Hui 
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 Except for PCIO, there are no other systemic statistics of social and economic status 
as early as 1952 at county level in Zhejiang. 
26  We also regress PCIO in 1952 on the guerrilla/non-guerrilla dummies, after 
controlling for the geographical variables included in Table 2-Table 4. The regression 
results are very similar to that of the t-test comparisons. 
province, etc). 27 Table 5 presents the results of the ET estimation. From column 
1 to column 3 are results when the outcome variables are per capita tax revenues, 
public expenditures on education, and per capita private output growth rate, 
respectively. In the first two columns, the Wald test p-values at the bottom of the 
Panel B indicate that the treatment variable (GC) should be viewed as endogenous 
in the model. In all the three columns, the treatment variable GC has the expected 
signs and is statistically significant. In fact, the marginal effects of the treatment 
become larger after we take the endogeneity issue into account. Based on the 
estimation results, if a non-guerrilla county turned into a guerrilla county, then its 
per capita local tax revenue will decrease by around 14.4 percent, its per capita 
expenditure on education will increase by 3.2 percent, and the private sector 
growth rate will increase by 1.4 percent, respectively. 
[Table 5 about here] 
    Based on the ET estimation, we further consider how the GC treatment 
effects interact with the power distribution at the top of the provincial power 
hierarchy. Our theory in fact suggests that when a politician’s political status in the 
power distribution changes, his/her policies will change accordingly to reflect such 
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 We prefer the endogenous treatment model to the Instrumental Variable model 
because the treatment variable, GC, is a binary dummy variable so ET model is more 
appropriate in our case. However, we also tried the IV estimation in which GC_ 
Neighbor and BORDER are used as exclusive instruments for GC, and we got 
very similar results as what we report here.  
changes. To test this interaction effects, we first divide all members sitting in the 
Zhejiang provincial party standing committee (PSC), the paramount power body 
of a province, into three groups: the Guerrilla group (those who were elevated 
from the GC counties), the Southbound Cadre group (those who were recruited 
from the SC counties), and the Outsider Group (who were transferred to Zhejiang 
from other provinces by the central government). We then calculate the share of 
the Guerrilla groups in the total PSC members (GC_PSC) in various years and 
control for the interaction between GC and GC_PSC in the ET model. We already 
confirm that guerrilla counties tend to have lower tax burdens, greater 
expenditures on education, and faster private sector growth rate. However, we 
expect that such economic effects should be weakened when there were more PSC 
members who climbed up the power hierarchy from guerrilla counties since we 
believe the more representatives the guerrilla counties have in the PSC should 
improve the political situation of politicians in the guerrilla counties relative to 
their counterparts in the non-guerrilla counties.         
    The new results after controlling for the interaction effects are reported in 
column 4 (for per capita tax revenues), column 5 (for expenditures on education), 
and column 6 (private sector growth rate), respectively.28 Figure 2a - Figure 2c 
illustrate how the effects of GC vary with the whole value range of GC_PSC, 
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 Because GC_PSC has a same value in each year for all the counties, so in column 
4-column 6 we do not include the dummy variables for the various years as we do in 
column 1-column3.  
which are derived from the results of column 3-column5, respectively. Figure 2a 
shows that in contrast to the non-guerrilla counties, the guerrilla counties have 
lower tax burdens, while the gap between the two types of counties tends to be 
reduced as the value of PC_PSC increases. Figure 2b and Figure 2c show that in 
contrast to non-guerrilla counties, the guerrilla counties have greater per capita 
fiscal expenditures on education and higher private sector growth rate, respectively, 
but the differences between them become smaller as the value of PC_PSC 
increases. In fact, in figure 2c, after the value of PC_PSC increase to a certain 
level (0.3), the differences in private sector growth rate between the two types of 
counties are no longer statistically significant. All of these results are consistent 
with our theoretical expectations.  
6. Conclusion 
 In this paper, we study how political factionalism affects the policy choices 
of local politicians in the context of China's authoritarian political system. We 
argue that in order to secure their political survival, local political elites who 
belong to dominant faction will invest more in loyalty signaling to have protection 
or support from the powerful patrons, while the others who are politically 
marginalized will focus more on delivering good governance and public goods 
provisions to win over support from local grassroots constituents. With the aid of a 
unique county-level dataset collected from Zhejiang province during the period of 
1994-2005, we found compared with counties under the rule of marginalized 
faction (i.e., the GC group), counties under the sphere of influence of the dominant 
faction (i.e., the SC group) had higher tax rates, lower public expenditures on 
education and social welfare, and a slower economic growth rate. 
  One insight this research offers into the political economy of 
authoritarianism is that the logic of factional politics, combined with historical 
shocks, can make a politically centralized communist state such as China no 
longer economically monolithic, since how political elites perform economically 
can vary substantially with their differing status within the ruling party. This helps 
us understand why within China a huge economic variance exists across various 
regions, even within a province, and such variations can persist through long 
periods as long as the factional conflicts unfold in the similar manner as we depict 
in this article. For example, in Zhejiang province, it has been long noted that local 
economic development models differ substantially between GCs and Non-GCs, in 
terms of local policy orientations toward private sector and property rights 
protections (Zhang and Liu 2013). Similar scenarios are found between Su’nan 
(Southern Jiangsu) and Non-Su’nan regions in Jiangsu province (Zhang et al. 
2017), between Mindong (Eastern Fujian) and Non-Mindong regions (Fang et al. 
2017), and so forth. Furthermore, we suspect that the mechanism of local 
factionalism and its effects on policy choices on the part of local elites are common in 
the developing world, especially where historical shocks have produced elite 
cleavages similar to the ones identified in this research, e.g., the local natives versus 
newly arrived Kuomintang (KMT) in Taiwan and northerners versus southerners in 
Vietnam after the communist victory (Edmund 2008).  
 Another natural question is, given the obvious importance of maintaining 
close relationships with powerful patrons in authoritarian politics, why don't those 
politically marginalized officials make more of an effort to join the dominant 
faction? Theoretically speaking, officials on the political periphery can participate 
in the competition of displaying loyalty to the powerful patrons in order to be 
absorbed into the small circles of the latter. Given the fact that Zhejiang's factional 
politics have remained basically unchanged over the past six decades, 29 we 
hypothesize that, for those political elites excluded by the core faction, the chance 
of being admitted into it is small, therefore in practice it is dangerous for the 
marginalized officials to show loyalty at all costs to the powerful patrons. Testing 
this hypothesis, however, is beyond the scope of this research, and we leave this 
work to the future.
                                                             
29
 Zhejiang is not unique in this regard. Recent studies on China's other provinces 
make the similar observation that the provincial power distribution between a 
province's factions has remained rather stable since 1949. See Liu et al. (2012) for a 
case study on Hebei province. 
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 Table 1  Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A:       
Variable Name 
County Obs.  
(=0) 
 
County Obs. 
(=1) 
 
County Obs. 
(=2) 
Guerrilla County dummy 16  37   
Guerrilla County dummy_new 22  31   
Guerrilla County dummy_area 22  19  12 
      
Panel B:      
Variable name 
County-yr  
Obs. 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
Per Capita Tax Burden 786 97.78  102.68  0.14  635.17  
Per Capita GDP 800 8473.78  6208.07  1011.07  50819.34  
Per capita expenditure on Education 800 79.36  59.89  13.31  520.61  
Annual growth rate of Per Capita GDP 737 0.12  0.07  -0.87  0.40  
 
Table
Table 2  Estimation results: basic results 
 Tax Burden 
Expenditure on 
Education 
Annual GDP 
Growth rate 
Guerrilla County dummy -0.37 0.09 0.02 
 (0.15)** (0.03)*** (0.01)*** 
Log (per capita GDP)-1 1.15 0.31 -0.003 
 (0.20)*** (0.04)*** (0.01) 
Log (population) 0.75 -0.19 0.01 
 (0.20)*** (0.02)*** (0.00)** 
Log (distance to Hangzhou) -0.17 -0.03 -0.01 
 (0.11) (0.03) (0.01) 
Log (altitude of county seat) -0.00 0.02 -0.01 
 (0.06) (0.02) (0.00)** 
Costal Dummy 0.03 0.02 0.01 
 (0.15) (0.05) (0.01) 
Time Trend 0.01 0.13 -0.00 
 (0.03) (0.01)*** (0.00)** 
    
Year Fixed effect YES YES YES 
    
R2  0.52 0.96 0.30 
No. of Observations 624 520 624 
Reported in parentheses are robust standard errors. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 Table 3  Robust test results - 1: new definition of Political connection 
 Tax Burden 
Expenditure on 
Education 
Annual GDP 
Growth rate 
    
Guerrilla County dummy_new -0.49 0.10 0.02 
 (0.16)*** (0.03)*** (0.01)*** 
Log (per capita GDP)-1 1.26 0.29 -0.01 
 (0.22)*** (0.04)*** (0.01) 
Log (population) 0.77 -0.20 0.01 
 (0.20)*** (0.02)*** (0.00)* 
Log (distance to Hangzhou) -0.13 -0.03 -0.01 
 (0.11) (0.03) (0.01)** 
Log (altitude of county seat) 0.02 0.02 -0.01 
 (0.06) (0.02) (0.00)** 
Costal Dummy -0.02 0.04 0.01 
 (0.15) (0.04) (0.01) 
Time Trend -0.00 0.14 -0.00 
 (0.03) (0.01)*** (0.00)* 
    
Year Fixed effect YES YES YES 
    
R2  0.53 0.96 0.30 
No. of Observations 624 520 624 
Reported in parentheses are robust standard errors.  * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 Table 4 Robust Test results 2 
 
Tax Burden 
Expenditure on 
Education 
Annual GDP 
Growth rate 
    
    
Guerrilla County dummy_area1 -0.58 0.10 0.02 
 (0.19)*** (0.03)*** (0.01)*** 
Guerrilla County dummy_area2 -0.34 0.09 0.02 
 (0.12)*** (0.04)*** (0.01)*** 
Log (per capita GDP)-1 1.29 0.29 -0.01 
 (0.22)*** (0.04)*** (0.01) 
Log (population) 0.74 -0.19 0.01 
 (0.19)*** (0.02)*** (0.01)** 
Log (distance to Hangzhou) -0.07 -0.04 -0.01 
 (0.11) (0.03) (0.01)** 
Log (altitude of county seat) 0.02 0.02 -0.01 
 (0.06) (0.02) (0.00)** 
Costal dummy -0.05 0.04 0.01 
 (0.14) (0.04) (0.01) 
Time Trend -0.01 0.14 -0.00 
 (0.03) (0.01)*** (0.00)* 
    
Year Fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
    
R2 0.54 0.96 0.30 
No. of Observations 624 520 624 
Reported in parentheses are robust standard errors.  * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Table 5 Endogenous Binary Variable Treatment Effect Model Results 
 
Tax Burden 
Expenditure on 
Education 
Annual GDP 
Growth rate 
Tax Burden 
Expenditure on 
Education 
Annual GDP 
Growth rate 
Panel A: the outcome equation       
       
Guerrilla County dummy (GC) -0.50*** 0.15*** 0.01*** -0.70** 0.31** 0.06***  
 (0.10) (0.03) (0.005) (0.30) (0.12) (0.02)  
GC*GC_PSC    0.74 -0.65 -0.19**  
    (1.07) (0.41) (0.08)  
Proportion of PSC members from 
guerrilla counties (GC_PSC) 
  
 1.67 
(0.92) 
0.30 
(0.35) 
0.01 
(0.07)   
       
Year Fixed effect Yes Yes Yes No No No 
       
Panel B: the treatment (GC) equation       
GC_Neighbor  6.90***  4.56***  5.79***  6.93*** 5.10***  5.80***  
 (0.93)  (0.69)  (0.74)  (0.94) (0.76)  (0.74)  
Border dummy -4.07***  -3.63**  -4.18***  -4.07*** -4.02***  -4.20***  
 (0.36)  (0.39)  (0.35)  (0.36) (0.35)  (0.34)  
       
No. of Obs. 624 520 624 624 520 624 
P-value of Wald Chi2 test for 
independence 
0.02 0.00 0.56 0.00 0.00 0.56 
Reported in parentheses are robust standard errors.  * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Note: All regressions in both Panel A include Log (per capita GDP)-1, Log (population), Log (distance to Hangzhou), Log (altitude of county seat), Costal 
dummy, and Time trend, and in Panel B include Log (distance to Hangzhou), Log (altitude of county seat), and Costal dummy. For space reason, we do 
not present the estimated coefficients of these variables. 
 
 
 Figure 1: Power Contrast in Zhejiang Provincial Party Standing Committee, 1950-90 
 
 
Note:  In the figure, the SCs are those who are directly from the Third Field Army and 
its affiliated civilian officials who entered Zhejiang in 1949. The LGCs are those who 
participated in the guerrilla warfare before 1949. We do not include those who were 
elevated to the PPSC only after 1949 as well as those who were transferred to Zhejiang 
from outside provinces after 1949. So the sum of the SCs proportion and the LGCs 
proportion can be less than 1. 
 
 
Figure
Figure 2  The contrast of average treatment effects of GC 
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a. the outcome variable is per capita tax revenues b. the outcome variable is per capita expenditure on education c. the outcome variable is private sector growth rate 
figures on the x-axis are values of GC_PSC (the proportion of PSC members who were elevated from the guerrilla counties) 
 
 Note: figure 2a, 2b, and 2c are based on the estimation results of column 4, column 5, and column 6 in Table 5, respectively. 
RE:  “Policy Choice and Economic Growth under Factional Politics: Evidence from a 
Chinese Province” 
November 5, 2017 
 
Dear Xiaobo, 
 
We appreciate the careful readings of our manuscript by the reviewer, as well as 
her/his valuable suggestions. The following are the summary of our response to the 
two reviewers’ questions and suggestions. 
 
1. The reviewer’s main concern is that if our key explanatory captures the political 
connections of counties. She/he proposes to look at county leaders’ connections (to 
the provincial authority). 
        Our response: We believe in Zhejiang case current explanatory variable (GC) is 
superior to other alternative variables, such as those based on connections of 
individual politicians as suggested by the reviewer. The reason is that in Zhejiang 
context the role of local individual politicians is rather limited. Rather, it is the 
interactions of officials and cadres at various levels from the two factions (SCs 
versus GCs) that forge the final equilibria of local policy making and its 
implementations. For example, from 1949 onwards, almost all senior positions from 
provincial level down to county level are occupied by SCs but they cannot simply 
sway the policy outcomes across different localities because these policies meet 
resistances from or were altered by local GCs to fit their interests (Zhang and Liu 
forthcoming). For other works on local selective implementations, see O’Brien and 
Li (1996), Oi (1985), Liu (1992), Tsai (2006). Hence in the formal texts, especially in 
the introduction of the power structure in Zhejiang,  we place more emphasis on the 
group identity of local political elites rather than individual county leading cadres 
such as county party secretary or county head. We put these points in the last 
paragraph including a new footnote 16 in the revised draft.  
      Take two recent salient examples. One is that in 2005 or so, then the Taizhou city 
leaders decided to merge Huangyan County into Taizhou by turning the county into 
a district unit of Taizhou city. The order was opposed by Huangyan’s local cadres, 
who even deposed the head of Huangyan People’s Congress, who were appointed by 
Taizhou city leadership to oversee the task of merging Huangyan into Taizhou. 
Huangyan’s local cadres even appealed to provincial authority and the central 
government as well. Eventually both Taizhou and Huangyan made a compromise in 
2008-2009 so that Huangyan became a district of Taizhou but remained its old fiscal 
independence and autonomy. The other example is in Wenzhou (another typical GC 
area) its party secretary in 2014-2015 ordered to remove crosses from churches in 
its jurisdiction. The campaign stoked wide protests from local society and tacit 
resistance from local cadres, so that the campaign was put to end only lasting for 
one year.  
     Another reason we do not rely on county leaders’ personal political connections 
as the main explanatory is the relevant data is seriously restricted. Having the 
reviewer’s concern in mind, we glean personal data on Zhejiang’s county party 
secretary (CPS) and county head (CH) but eventually we only have in total 75 
*Detailed Response to Reviewers
county-year observations. Response Table 1 at the end of this Response Letter gives 
a detailed list of CPS/CH across different counties and years that is available for 
empirical analysis.  
    Based on this information, we construct three variables to reflect CPS/CH’s 
personal features and their connections as well, including: a dummy variable for the 
local background of CPS/CH (=1, if CPS/CH was born in the county or escalated their 
career from within the county; =0, otherwise); CPS/CH’s connections with 
provincial leadership, measured as the proportion of provincial party standing 
committee (PPSC) members who once shared previous working experience 
(professional link) with the CPS/CH in the county, in the same administrative or 
party unit for over one year, within two administrative steps of one another before 
they served in the PPSC (Shih et al. 2010; Mayer et al. 2015). We found in a majority 
of these tests our conclusions still hold, and they further confirm our argument that 
in Zhejiang local policy choices as well as its outcomes are equilibria resulting more 
from factional politics between the two groups than from individual leading officials’ 
personal preferences and decisions. We put these points in the last paragraph of 
section 5.3 in the revised draft. For space reason, we do not put the table in the 
formal texts but instead present the results in Response Table A2 at the end of this 
Response Letter for your reference. 
      
       
2.  To better reflect the county leaders’ connections, the reviewer suggests us to look 
at county leader’s promotion and fiscal transfers a county received from above (in 
Zhejiang’s fiscal system this is equivalent to province-to-county transfers).  
Our response: By virtue of the same reason in Response point 1, we do not think 
personal promotion perspective fits Zhejiang. For example, in Wenzhou all the city’s 
party secretary were appointed by the provincial authority in the first place and 
almost all of them were then promoted to higher positions, say, Wang Jianman 
(2004-2008) , Chen Derong (2010-2013), Chen Yixin (2013-2015),…. For these 
individual politicians, they indeed got big promotions to more senior positions after 
they finished their career in Wenzhou. But in fact Wenzhou is a typical bastion of GC 
faction and therefore has been one of the regions with worst relation with the 
provincial leadership (dominated by the SC faction). Besides, as aforementioned in 
Response Point 1, limited official data and poor information revelation regarding 
these leading cadres make it impossible to track their career path to test the driving 
forces behind their promotions. 
But we do have data from Qian and Zhang (2017) on province-to-county transfers 
to test the underlying rationale of clientelism in Zhejiang. The results are presented 
in Response Table A3 for reference, using province-to-county earmarked transfers 
per capita a county received from provincial government as outcome variable. As it 
shows, there is significant negative relationship between transfers and GC dummy, 
showing that GCs indeed received less earmarked transfers compared with Non-GCs. 
This effect still holds even after we control for county leaders’ personal background 
(the observations drop to 75), and the latter variables are not that important in the 
distribution of transfers.  
Although the above results lend more support to our argument, we do not put 
these evidence in the manuscript because we think that clientelism is another big 
issue that is beyond the scope of this article. We believe it is worth doing further in-
depth researches on this topic in future works.  
 
3. Other responses: 
       (1) The reviewer asks if we can take advantage of the information of GC locals in 
provincial party standing committee.  
We actually have done this in section 5 of the original draft. 
        (2) The reviewer wonders if there are other alternative explanations, e.g., GCs 
have stronger local state capacity and are more effective on tax enforcement.  
        We acknowledge that there might be other potential variables that we do not 
control for in this article. We do hope to control for more variables if richer data are 
available in the future so we can take more competing hypotheses into account. In 
the meantime, we believe factors such as local state capacity do not nullify the 
validity of our hypotheses because: firstly, local state capacity itself can likely be 
endogenous from factionalism as we emphasize in this article; secondly, it is hard to 
believe that state infrastructure capacity differs along the line between GCs and 
Non-GCs. Even if we accept that taxation ability is weaker in GCs due to reasons 
other than factionalism, it is hard to reconcile with the findings that GCs have 
greater investment in public goods provisions because the capacity to invest in 
public goods also is a reflection of state capacity. 
      (3) The reviewer asks why less connected agents would not tax even more to 
signal their loyalty to the superiors? Why embarrassing local constituents is a 
credible signal of loyalty to higher level patrons? 
        We actually have tackled the issues in the manuscript including the revised 
version. The two questions are relevant to each other.  The key point is that there is 
an opportunity cost of taxing more to send loyalty signal because the more taxes 
local elites levy the more they hurt their grassroots constituents. This certainly put 
them in danger, especially when local elites have poor relationship with powerful 
patrons and they have to rely more on their grassroots constituents. By the same 
token, in such case embarrassing local constituents is not a cheap talk but a credible 
signal of loyalty to higher level patrons. These discussions can be found in section 2. 
In Conclusion section, we return to this issue and acknowledge that further research 
should be done to get to the bottom of the game of loyalty displaying under 
authoritarianism. 
(4) The reviewer hopes us to add discussions on the difference in development 
outcomes between GCs and non-GCs, whether it persisted, and whether the 
difference is a Zhejiang-specific phenomenon or a more generality under 
authoritarianism, etc.  
We revise the first two paragraphs of the Conclusion section in response to these 
questions. We point out that systematic difference between regions identified in this 
research is a more general phenomenon across China and we suspect similar logic 
developed in this research can apply to other developing countries, especially where 
historical shocks have produced elite cleavages similar to the ones identified in this 
research, e.g., the local natives versus newly arrived Kuomintang (KMT) in Taiwan and 
northerners versus southerners in Vietnam after the communist victory. 
 
          
 
Thank you and the reviewers for all of your suggestions on the revision of this 
manuscript. 
 
I look forward to hearing from you. 
 
Best, 
 
Luke Qi Zhang 
Associate Professor 
China Center for Economic Studies, School of Economics 
Fudan University 
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Response Table 1 Data availability on County Party Secretary (CPS) and  
County Head (CH) in Zhejiang 
County name Data available for 
periods  
 County name Data available 
for periods 
An’Ji 2003-2005  Rui’an 2002-2005 
Cang Nan 2003-2005  Shao Xing 2003-2005 
Cang Shan 2003-2005  Sheng Si 2002-2005 
Chang Xing 2001-2005  Sheng Zhou 2004-2005 
Chun’an 2002-2005  Tai Shun 2002-2005 
De Qing 2003-2005  Wen Cheng 2003-2005 
Dong Tou 2002-2005  Wu Yi 2005 
Fu Yang 2002-2005  Xian Ju 2005 
Hai Ning 2004-2005  Yi Wu 2005 
Jia Shan 2003-2005  Yong Jia 2003-2005 
Jian De 2005  Yu Huan 2005 
Jiang Shan 2004-2005  Yue Qing 2005 
Jin Yun 2005    
Lan Xi 2004-2005    
Lin Hai 2005    
Long Quan 2005    
Pan’an 2003-2005    
Ping Yang 2003-2005    
Pu Jiang 2005    
Qing Tian 2004-2005    
Qing Yuan 2004-2005    
 
 
Response Table 2:  Control for county leader’s personal characteristics and networks 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Panel A: outcome variable is Tax Burden    
Guerrilla County dummy (GC) -0.72*** -0.57** -0.55* 
 (0.25) (0.28) (0.28) 
County Party Secretary (CPS) was born in the 
county (yes=1, no=0) 
-0.47** 
(0.22) 
 
 
County head (CH) was born in the county (yes=1, 
no=0) 
-0.24 
(0.19) 
 
 
CPS received formal education in college (yes=1, 
no=0) 
 -0.23 
(0.25) 
 
CH received formal education in college (yes=1, 
no=0) 
 -0.09 
(0.27) 
 
   CPS’s connections to provincial leadership   -2.47* 
(1.42) 
   CH’s connections to provincial leadership   0.75 
(1.17) 
    
   No. of observations 75 75 75 
Reported in parentheses are robust standard errors.  * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. All regressions 
include Log (per capita GDP)-1, Log (population), Log (distance to Hangzhou), Log (altitude of 
county seat), Costal dummy, and Time trend, and year fixed effect. For space reason, we do 
not present the estimated coefficients of these variables.  
 
Response Table 3: Clientelism under factionalism: considering province-to-county transfers in Zhejiang 
Outcome variables (1) 
Log (earmarked transfers) 
(2) 
Log(earmarked transfers per capita) 
Panel A:    
Guerrilla County dummy (GC) -0.09*** 
(0.03) 
-0.09*** 
(0.03) 
   
   No. of observations 614 613 
Panel B:    
Guerrilla County dummy (GC) -0.13* 
(0.07) 
-0.11** 
(0.06) 
   
CPS was born in the county (yes=1, no=0) 0.07 
(0.07) 
0.05 
(0.07) 
CH was born in the county (yes=1, no=0) 0.16** 
(0.07) 
0.18*** 
(0.07) 
   
   No. of observations 75 75 
   
   
Panel C:   
Guerrilla County dummy (GC) -0.16*** 
(0.06) 
-0.14** 
(0.06) 
   
  CPS’s connections to provincial leadership -0.11 
(0.52) 
0.05 
(0.36) 
  CH’s connections to provincial leadership 0.20 
(0.37) 
0.26 
(0.37) 
   
   No. of observations 75 75 
Reported in parentheses are robust standard errors.  * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. All regressions include Log (per capita GDP)-1, Log 
(population), Log (distance to Hangzhou), Log (altitude of county seat), Costal dummy, and Time trend, and year fixed effect. For 
space reason, we do not present the estimated coefficients of these variables. We do not report results after controlling for CPS/CH’s 
education level, which is very similar to what report here. 
